Are migrants more productive than stayers? Some evidence for a set of highly productive academic economists by Albarrán, Pedro et al.
  
 
 
 
This is a postprint version of the following published document: 
 
 
 
Albarrán, P., Carrasco, R. and Ruiz-Castillo, J. (2017). Are migrants more 
productive than stayers? Some evidence for a set of highly productive 
academic economists.  Economic Inquiry, v. 55, n. 3, pp. 1308-1323. 
Available in: https://doi.org/2010.1111/ecin.12430 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Wiley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARE MIGRANTS MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN STAYERS? SOME EVIDENCE
FROM A SET OF HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS
PEDRO ALBARRÁN, RAQUEL CARRASCO and JAVIER RUIZ-CASTILLO∗
This article compares the average productivity of migrants (who work in a country
different from their country of origin) and stayers (whose entire academic career takes
place in their country of origin) in a set of 2,530 highly productive economists that
work in 2007 in a selection of the top 81 Economics departments worldwide. The main
findings are the following two. First, productivity comparisons depend on the cohort and
the type of department. For example, in the top U.S. departments, foreigners are more
productive than stayers only among older individuals; in the bottom U.S. departments,
this is the case for both cohorts, while in the other countries the productivity of foreigners
and stayers is indistinguishable for both cohorts. Second, when we restrict our attention
to an elite consisting of economists with above average productivity, all productivity
differences between migrants and stayers in the United States vanish. As our analysis
depends on observational data in which the migration decision is not exogenously
identified, our estimates have a descriptive rather than a causal interpretation. However,
our results are very robust to the treatment of the elite, the partition into several
department categories, and the definition of the cohorts and the productivity notion.
(JEL J61)
I. INTRODUCTION
In all sciences, researchers originate from
many countries. However, when we focus on the
most productive and influential researchers we
observe that a large contingent of scientists work-
ing in the top U.S. research institutions have
obtained their first college degree in their country
of origin. Understandably, this situation can be
described as a case of what Hunter, Oswald, and
Charlton (2009) calls the elite brain drain—a
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worrisome phenomenon from the point of view
of the sending countries.1
Based on a sample of highly productive
academic economists, our main aim is to study
whether the productivity of foreigners is greater
or not than the productivity of stayers—who are
those who study and work in their country of
origin—both in the United States and in other
countries with at least one department in the sam-
ple (Other Sample Countries or OSC hereafter).
This is an interesting question for several reasons.
First, brain drain is an important phenomenon
in all sciences. The share of economists who are
migrants in our dataset is 41.1% in the United
1. For the economics of immigration, see Borjas (1999)
and Stark (2005), and for a survey of four decades of eco-
nomics research on the brain drain, see Doquier and Rapoport
(2012). Specifically, for the elite brain drain, see inter alia
Stephan and Levin (2001), Laudel (2003, 2005), Bauwens,
Mion, and Thisse (2008), and Panaretos and Malesios (2012).
ABBREVIATIONS
EU: European Union
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
OSC: Other Sample Countries
RW: Rest of the World
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States and 38.5% in the OSC. For the under-
standing of the academic sector, we would like to
know whether migrants are more productive than
stayers. Second, this question is relevant for the
design of immigration/emigration policies. For
example, from a world welfare point of view, if
it were the case that migrants are generally more
productive than stayers, then there are reasons
to defend the validity of policies aimed at facili-
tating increased brain exchange across countries
(Franzoni, Scellato, and Stephan 2014). Natu-
rally, as we will see in the discussion section, this
is not the only point of view to be considered.
The results in the literature concerning the
existence of productivity differences between
migrants and nationals in the U.S. academic
sector are mixed. Independently of the fact that
different studies use different methodologies,
as well as different productivity measures for
scientists in different fields during different time
periods, there are also important differences
in the characteristics of the group to whom
migrants are compared. For example, Hunter,
Oswald, and Charlton (2009) study a small
sample of 138 highly cited researchers writing in
physics journals between 1981 and 1999. Using
a simple formal model, their main conclusion is
that, due to low mobility costs, the distribution
of talent can be expected to be similar across
different countries, so that foreigners who move
to the United States go on to be neither more
nor less distinguished than American-born elite
physicists. This contradicts the results from two
important contributions whose datasets consist of
more than 2,500 Ph.D. economists working in the
United States (McDowell and Singell 2000), or
more than 14,000 retrospective questionnaires in
several sciences (Franzoni, Scellato, and Stephan
2014). Both studies find that, after controlling
for the endogeneity of the migration decision,
migrant scientists exhibit superior performance.2
Our contribution to this literature is twofold.
First, we observe the existence of department
effects in the United States, in the sense that when
we partition the U.S. departments into several
categories according to their prestige—say, top,
intermediate, and bottom categories—the aver-
age productivity of economists working in each
category is hierarchically ordered. Department
2. The same conclusion is reached by Ruhose et al.
(2015) for 565 high-skilled German immigrants versus
289,538 high-skilled U.S. natives. However, rather than Ph.D.
holders working in the U.S. academic sector, the high-skilled
in this paper are individuals with a B.A. or higher degree who
work in any type of full-time job in the United States.
effects are not explored byMcDowell and Singell
(2000) or Franzoni, Scellato, and Stephan (2014).
In our case, controlling for fixed department
effects has no effect. However, when we make
productivity comparisons between migrants and
stayerswithin department categories, we discover
that the situation is different in top and bottom
U.S. institutions. Second, consider the possibil-
ity of restricting the attention to some subset of
researchers in the upper tail of the ordered indi-
vidual productivity distribution. We refer to such
subset as the elite. In this paper, we establish that
when we make such a move in Hunter, Oswald,
and Charlton’s (2009) model, the productivity of
elite migrants converges to the productivity of
elite stayers.We test this prediction with our data.
Our dataset consists of 2,530 economists that
work in 2007 in the top 81 Economics depart-
ments worldwide according to the Econphd.net
(2004) rankings. Not surprisingly, 52 of the 81
departments are located in the United States.
There are only 11 OSC with at least one of
the remaining 29 non-U.S. departments in the
sample. We measure individual productivity in
terms of a quality index that weights the number
of publications from the beginning of everyone’s
career up to 2007 in four journal classes. We use
different weighting schemes leading to different
productivity measures.
As is well known, the unobservable ability of
individuals is correlated both to migration and to
performance. But our productivity comparisons
are obtained with retrospective data concerning
economists’ mobility and aggregate productivity
up to 2007. Thus, in the absence of informa-
tion for correcting the typical positive selection
into migration among the high skilled, the endo-
geneity of individuals’ locational choice makes a
causal interpretation of our results impossible. In
this situation, we are restricted to searching for
robust correlations capturing some new stylized
facts worth investigating further in economics
and other scientific disciplines.
Our preferred specification consists of the
double partition of departments into three
categories—top U.S. departments, bottom U.S.
departments, and OSC departments—and indi-
viduals into two cohorts of young and older
people. In this specification, we make six pro-
ductivity comparisons between foreigners and
stayers. Together with demographic variables,
we control for a relatively rich set of career
variables, namely, the university where each
individual earns her B.A., and her Ph.D., as well
as the university where each holds her first job.
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Moreover, for the reasons explained before, we
find it interesting to make all of our productivity
comparisons for the entire population consisting
of 2,530 economists, and an elite consisting of
833 individuals with above average productivity.
Our main results are the following four. First,
in the top 25 U.S. departments, the productivity
of foreigners in the total sample is greater than
the productivity of stayers only among the older
individuals. Among the young, the productivity
of the two groups is indistinguishable. Second,
in the bottom 27 U.S. departments the situation
is very different. The key feature is the very low
productivity of both young and older stayers in
the total sample. Thus, migrants are more produc-
tive than stayers in both cohorts in this sample.
Third, in agreement with our extension of Hunter,
Oswald, and Charlton’s (2009)model, all produc-
tivity differences between foreigners and stayers
in the United States vanish in the elite. Finally,
in the OSC departments, foreigners and stayers
are equally productive in the two cohorts. This is
the case both in the total sample and the elite.
A remarkable aspect of these findings is that
they are robust in the following four directions:
(1) the partition of the 81 departments into three
or more categories, (2) the treatment of the elite,
(3) the definition of the two cohorts, and (4) the
weighting scheme used in the construction of the
productivity measure.
The rest of the article consists of four sections.
Section II presents the data, as well as some
descriptive statistics. Section III describes the
sequence of estimates leading to our preferred
specification, and presents the key empirical
results comparing the productivity of migrants
and stayers in the total sample and the elite
controlling for demographics and career vari-
ables. Section IV discusses the robustness and
a plausible interpretation of the results. Finally,
Section V offers some concluding comments.
Appendix S1, Supporting Information, includes
some statistical material, and an extension of
Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton’s (2009) model.
To save space, we will refer to other statistical
material in the Working Paper version of this
article, Albarrán et al. (2016).
II. DATA, THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY,
AND THE ELITE NOTION
A. The Data
In this subsection, we briefly describe the
dataset used in this article. In the first place,
we select the top 81 departments worldwide
according to the Econphd.net (2004) university
rankings. This ranking is built upon the pub-
lications in the period 1993–2003 in the top
63 Economics journals in the Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003) weighted journal
ranking, where the weights reflect journal cita-
tion counts adjusted for factors such as the annual
number of pages and the age of the journal (for
further methodological details, see Econphd.net
rankings 2004).3
Searching in the 81 departmental web pages
in 2007, we found a total of 2,705 economists
with the minimum information we require for
each individual: nationality, university where a
Ph.D. is obtained, age, and publications in the
periodical literature up to 2007. The information
concerning the country of birth is seldom avail-
able. Therefore, we assign the nationality in terms
of the country where each individual obtains a
B.A. or an equivalent first college degree.4 Sim-
ilarly, since an individual’s age is not generally
available we use the academic age, namely, the
number of years elapsed since earning a Ph.D.
(or equivalent degree) up to 2007 as a measure
of experience.
B. The Measurement of Individual Productivity
We take information available in Internet (per-
sonal web pages, RePEc, Publish or Perish, etc.)
on publications up to 2007 of these 2,705 people.
Because of budgetary restrictions, our informa-
tion on productivity suffers from two limitations.
First, the article count in our dataset made no dis-
tinction between single and multiple authorship.
Consequently, no correction for coauthorship
could be implemented. Nevertheless, there is
evidence that the average number of authors per
article in Economics & Business in 2003–2011
is 1.8, whereas the mean and standard deviation
for 30 broad scientific disciplines are 3.1 and 1.1,
3. We have compared this list with the first 81 Economics
departments listed in three other equally acceptable university
rankings. The main conclusion is that, apart from differences
in the order in which each institution appears in the various
rankings, our list has between 70 and 73 departments in
common with each of the three other lists (for further details,
see Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo 2014). However,
the Econphd.net rankings (2004) department ranking is also
used in Oyer (2006).
4. Consider the case of a foreigner earning her B.A. in a
U.S. institution who works in the United States in 2007. She
will be classified as a U.S. stayer. Quite apart from the fact that
we do not have the means to learn about her true nationality,
in so far as this person does not consume national resources
in her college education, there are reasons to classify her as a
U.S. stayer.
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respectively (Ruiz-Castillo and Costas 2015).
Therefore, under the assumption that the assign-
ment of equal responsibility for coauthored
publications is a more acceptable assumption
when the number of authors per publication is
small, our practice of assigning full credit for
all publications to each author, independently of
whether they are coauthored or not, is a lesser
problem in our case. Second, although we know
the journal where each article is published, it
was impossible to search for the citation impact
achieved by every article. Therefore, we are
constrained to measuring individual productivity
as a function of the total number of publications
per person over her academic career up to 2007.
In every science, there is broad agreement
about the different merit associated to publish-
ing in a reduced number of top journals, a larger
set of excellent field journals, or the remaining
international or local journals. Although any spe-
cific classification will always be controversial,
a consensus on how to weight the different jour-
nal classes in order to reach a scalar measure of
productivity is possibly even harder to reach.
Starting from the top 63 journals in Kalaitzi-
dakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos’s (2003) journal
ranking, and taking also into account the rank-
ings in Lubrano et al. (2003), and Kodrzycki and
Yu (2006), in this paper we distinguish between
four journal classes.5 In our preferred weight-
ing scheme, the four classes are assigned weights
equal to 40, 15, 7, and 1 point, respectively. The
resulting quality index is denoted by Q. Being
aware that this option might be objected to for
placing too much weight on top journals, we
study the robustness of our findings using two
other productivity indices. The first one, denoted
by Q′, assigns weights equal to 20, 10, 5, and 1
point to the four classes. The last index, denoted
by P, weights equally all classes, that is, it mea-
sures individual productivity as the total number
of publications. Table A in Appendix S1 includes
the listing of the 81 departments, together with
5. Classes A, B, and C consist of 5, 34, and 47 journals,
while class D consists of any other journal. Class A includes
the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of
Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and
Review of Economic Studies. By way of example, the follow-
ing 12 journals are in class B: Economic Journal, Games and
Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Jour-
nal of Econometrics, Journal of Economic Growth, Journal
of Economic Theory, Journal of Finance, Journal of Labor
Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Pub-
lic Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, and Review of
Economics and Statistics. See Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-
Castillo (2014) for further details concerning this construc-
tion, including the listing of all journals in classes B and C.
information for each institution concerning the
number of faculty members (including Emeri-
tus Professors), the number of people without
publications, the remaining scholars’ publica-
tions in classes A to D, and the department
value of indices Q, Q′, and P. The OSC con-
sist of eight European countries (UK, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden, France, Germany, Bel-
gium, and Denmark), and three non-European
countries (Canada, Israel, and China).
C. The Total Sample Versus the Elite
Of the 2,705 economists in our dataset, there
are 175 faculty members without any publica-
tions at all (typically because they are at the
beginning of their career). In line with the pre-
vious literature on individual productivity, we
focus on what we call the total sample consist-
ing of the 2,530 faculty members with at least
one publication.
The following two characteristics of produc-
tivity distributions are worth noting. Consider
index Q. First, the 2,530 individuals in the total
sample are very productive: average productiv-
ity is 307.3 quality points per capita, equivalent
to more than seven articles of class A or about
20 articles of class B. Alternatively, the average
quality index is 16.1 per year during an academic
life (the period from the first year after receiving
a Ph.D. up to 2007), a quantity that can be com-
pared with the 15 points assigned to one article
in class B. Second, the distribution of individual
productivity is highly skewed. As many as 36.9%
of the sample has no class A publication, while
25% published once or twice, and the remaining
38.1% published three or more times in the top
journal class. However, the average productivity
is 17 percentage points above the median, and the
top 10% account for 40% of all quality points.6
In this context, we find it useful to define the elite
as consisting of the 833 individuals with above
average productivity.7
Productivity distributions Q′ and P are very
similar to distribution Q. In particular, the mean
productivity ofQ′ is equivalent to more than nine
6. Interestingly, these figures are of the same order of
magnitude as those found in Ruiz-Castillo and Costas (2015)
who study the productivity of 17.2 million authors in 30 broad
scientific fields with publications in the period 2003–2011.
7. Table B in the Appendix in Albarrán, Carrasco, and
Ruiz-Castillo (2014) lists all members of this elite (plus
equally productive Fellows of the Econometric Society who
are active in 2007 but not working in the 81 sample depart-
ments), including their Q value, their nationality, and the uni-
versity to which they are associated in 2007.
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articles in class A, whereas the mean productivity
of P is equal to 27 publications. However, since
the two new distributions exhibit essentially the
same skewness as distribution Q, if we define
the elite notion as we did for distribution Q the
corresponding sizes are of the same order of
magnitude as before: 843 for index Q′, and 835
for index P.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Specification Issues in the Total Sample
In this subsection, we introduce our preferred
specification for the total sample when individual
productivity is measured by the Q index. Given
the high skewness of the individual productivity
distribution, the dependent variable in the sequel
is always the log of the Q index.
We proceed in three steps. First, we ana-
lyze the important role of demographic vari-
ables (experience and gender). Second, we focus
attention on the comparison of the productivity
of foreigners and stayers in the United States
and the OSC, controlling for two types of vari-
ables: department effects in the United States,
and a number of other career variables, namely,
the university where each individual earned her
B.A. and her Ph.D., as well as the university
where she held her first job. Third, we study
how best to interact the migrant/stayer condi-
tion with department effects and vintage vari-
ables. The definition of all explanatory variables
will be presented in due order below. Descriptive
statistics for the total sample are included in the
left-hand panel in Table 1A, where the reference
group for any set of dummy variables is marked
with an asterisk.
Demographic Variables. As indicated in the
Introduction, our measure of aggregate produc-
tivity up to 2007 favors older people. Together
with the variable Experience (or Exp hereafter),
and (Exp)2, we introduce a dummy variable,
Young, that takes the value one for young people,
defined as those who earn a Ph.D. at most 20
years before 2007. Taking into account that the
median age for finishing a Ph.D. is approximately
30 (Scott and Siegfried 2008), young people in
our sample are those with at most 50 years of
age in 2007. They represent approximately half
of the total sample. To account for the possibility
that the productivity effect of one more year
of academic experience is different for young
and older individuals, our specification includes
TABLE 1
Explanatory Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Total
Sample Elite
(A)
Demographic variables
Mean years of experience (SD) 18.8 (12.4) 27.2 (10.4)
Younga 0.501 0.287
Youngb 0.458 0.131
Youngc 0.671 0.439
Females 0.140 0.054
Career variables
B.A. = Top 10 U.S. 0.118 0.176
B.A. = Next 15 U.S. 0.057 0.084
B.A. = Next 27 U.S. 0.053 0.059
B.A. = Other U.S. 0.159 0.184
B.A. = EUd,* 0.375 0.266
B.A. = RWe 0.238 0.231
Ph.D. = Harvard & MIT 0.139 0.214
Ph.D. = Other top 10 U.S. 0.296 0.328
Ph.D. = Next 15 U.S. 0.164 0.160
Ph.D. = Next 27 U.S. 0.072 0.070
Ph.D. = Other U.S. 0.021 0.013
Ph.D. = EUd,* 0.269 0.176
Ph.D. = RWe 0.039 0.039
First job=Top 10 U.S. 0.212 0.349
First job=Next 15 U.S. 0.145 0.167
First job=Next 27 U.S. 0.143 0.119
First job=Other U.S. 0.068 0.050
First job=EUd,* 0.272 0.192
First job=RWe 0.155 0.121
First job=Missing 0.005 0.001
Current job=Top 25 U.S.
departments
0.354 0.549
Current job=Last 27 U.S.
departments
0.266 0.218
Current job=OSC
departments*
0.380 0.233
Movers and stayers
U.S. brain circulation 0.003 0.006
U.S. brain drain 0.255 0.281
U.S. stayers 0.362 0.480
OSC brain circulation 0.071 0.059
OSC brain drain 0.147 0.068
OSC stayers* 0.162 0.106
Number of observations 2,530 833
(B)
U.S. brain circulation 0.003
USTop 25, foreigners, young 0.106
USTop 25, foreigners, old 0.046
USTop 25, stayers, young 0.081
USTop 25, stayers, old 0.118
USLast 27, foreigners, young 0.073
USLast 27, foreigners, old 0.029
USLast 27, stayers, young 0.054
USLast 27, stayers, old 0.109
OSC brain circulation 0.071
OSC foreigners, young 0.118
OSC foreigners, old 0.029
OSC stayers, young 0.101
OSC stayers, old* 0.062
Total number of observations 2,530
Percentage of young
USTop 25, foreigners 0.698
USTop 25, stayers 0.409
USLast 27, foreigners 0.715
USTop 25, stayers 0.328
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TABLE 1
Continued
Total
Sample Elite
OSC brain circulation 0.657
OSC foreigners 0.806
OSC stayers 0.620
Total sample 0.501
Notes: The total sample consists of faculty members with
at least one publication in the top 81 departments worldwide
according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking, while
the elite consists of individuals with above average produc-
tivity. Movers & stayers when an individual is Young if Expe-
rience≤ 20, and Old if Experience> 20.
aIndividuals with less than 20 years after earning a Ph.D.
∼ less than 50 years of age.
bIndividuals with less than 15 years after earning a Ph.D.
∼ less than 45 years of age.
cIndividuals with less than 24 years after earning a Ph.D.
∼ less than 54 years of age.
dEU stands for the 15 countries in the European Union
before the 2004 accession.
eRW stands for the Rest of the World, namely, countries
outside the United States and the EU.
∗Reference group in the regressions.
an interaction between the cohort and the age
variables. Finally, the dummy variable Female
takes the value one for females. Thus, model 1 is
the following:
Log Q = α0 + α1Exp + α2Exp2(1)
+ α3 (Exp × Young) + α4
(
Exp2 × Young
)
+ α5Young + α6Female + ϵ.
Regression results for this model, as well as
age, cohort, and gender effects are in the left-hand
panel of Table 2.
The six variables of the model are highly
significant. In agreement with human capital
models, we find a humped-shaped progression of
individual research productivity with academic
age because the stock of human capital needs
to be built up at the beginning of the career
while, due to the finiteness of life, no new invest-
ment offsets depreciation and net investment
declines (eventually) over time. Moreover, the
young are more productive than the old, and the
productivity gap of the young increases with
experience. Finally, females—representing 14%
of the total sample—are 57.9% less productive
than males. At any rate, experience, cohort, and
gender effects account for a large proportion of
the variance: the adjusted R2 in model 1 is 0.44.8
8. Interestingly, “Years since Ph.D. accounted for 43%
of the variance of log(total citations), 48% of the variance in
In order to test how robust age and cohort
effects are to the cohort definition, we experiment
with two other specifications: the variable Young
takes the value one when Exp is less than or equal
to 15 or 24, so that young people are individuals
with at most 45 or 54 years of age in 2007. The
percentage of young people becomes 45.8%
and 67.1%, respectively (Table 1A). Regression
results for the six variables in model 1 are in
Table 3 in Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo
(2016). Except for Young when Exp≤ 24, all
variables are again highly significant. Experi-
ence and gender effects are practically the same
as before. The only difference concerns cohort
effects: being young is somewhat more impor-
tant than before for the smaller subset of young
people in the second specification, whereas it
becomes negative for the larger subset of young
people in the third specification. Nevertheless,
the productivity gap between young and older
people increases with experience in all cases.
Judging from the adjusted R2, the importance
of experience, cohort, and gender effects is as
large as before.
In view of these results, we continue the anal-
ysis with the cohorts’ original definition. Never-
theless, in Section IV.C we study the robustness
of our key results with respect to alternative
cohort specifications.
Foreigners Versus Stayers: A First
Approximation. The 81 departments in the
sample are classified into Top and Bottom insti-
tutions using the Econphd department ranking
(Table A in Appendix S1). We begin by defining
the former as the 25 top U.S. departments (that
practically coincide with the top 25 departments
in the world). Among the Bottom institutions, we
distinguish between two categories: the last 27
U.S. departments, and the 29 non-U.S. depart-
ments located in the OSC.9 Group sizes are in
Table 1A.We should emphasize that the two Bot-
tom groups are heterogeneous categories with a
large overlap in terms of the Econphd department
log(h), 36% of the variance in log(e), and 54% of the variance
in log(hm) [e and hm are variants of the h index]” (Nosek et al.
2010, p. 1287).
9. Of course, which departments are in the “top 10,”
“top 25,” or “last 27” at any moment is open to debate.
Moreover, even if this classification is appropriate for
the period 2004–2007, individual departments are likely
to have changed positions over the period of this study
prior to 2007. Therefore, it is advisable to take this par-
tition as representative of “top” or “bottom” departments
in general.
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TABLE 2
A Sequence of Exploratory Models for the Total Sample
Dependent variable: log Q
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. t Statistic Coeff. t Statistic Coeff. t Statistic
Control variables
1. Exp 0.16 13.2* 0.16 15.2* 0.16 15.3*
2. Exp2 −0.002 −6.4* −0.002 −8.7* −0.00 −8.8*
3. Young×Exp 0.17 10.0* 0.22 10.6* 0.22 10.6*
4. Young×Exp2 −0.006 −8.5* −0.009 −10.4* −0.01 −10.4*
5. Young 0.003 0.04 −0.35 −3.1* −0.36 −3.1*
6. Female −0.58 −6.9* −0.55 −7.3* −0.55 −7.3*
1. B.A. = Top 10 U.S. 0.15 0.9 0.14 0.8
2. B.A. = Next 15 U.S. 0.002 0.01 −0.008 −0.04
3. B.A. = Next 27 U.S. 0.13 0.7 0.15 0.8
4. B.A. = Other U.S. 0.05 0.4 0.05 0.3
5. B.A. = EU, reference group — — — —
6. B.A. = RW 0.05 0.6 0.05 0.6
1. Ph.D. = Harvard & MIT 0.30 3.1* 0.30 3.2*
2. Ph.D. = Other Top 10 U.S. 0.09 1.1 0.10 1.1
3. Ph.D. = Next 15 U.S. 0.11 1.1 0.11 1.1
4. Ph.D. = Next 27 U.S. −0.08 −0.7 −0.08 −0.7
5. Ph.D. = Other U.S. −0.14 −0.8 −0.13 −0.8
6. Ph.D. = EU, reference group — — — —
7. Ph.D. = RW 0.45 3.6* 0.44 3.5*
1. FJ=Top 10 U.S. 0.29 3.1 0.30 3.2*
2. FJ=Next 15 U.S. −0.01 −0.1 −0.008 −0.1
3. FJ=Next 27 U.S. −0.06 −0.6 −0.06 −0.6
4. FJ=Other U.S. −0.13 −1.2 −0.14 −1.2
5. FJ=EU, reference group — — — —
6. FJ=RW −0.16 −1.6 −0.16 −1.6
7. FJ=Missing −1.58 −3.4* −1.57 −3.4*
Key variables
1. U.S. brain circulation — — 1. U.S. brain circ. 1.02 2.2*
2. U.S. foreigners −0.26 −0.7 2. U.S. top 25× frg. 0.94 6.2*
3. U.S. stayers −0.55 −1.7 × 3. U.S. top 25× stayers 0.74 3.2*
4. U.S. top 25 1.26 3.2* 4. U.S. last 27× frg. 0.44 3.1*
5. U.S. last 27 0.62 1.7 5. U.S. last 27× stayers 0.020.1
6. OSC brain circulation 0.21 1.7 6. OSC brain circ. 0.21 1.7
7. OSC foreigners 0.20 1.7 7. Foreigners 0.20 1.7
8. OSC stayers= reference group — — × 8. Stayers, ref. group — —
Constant 2.35 13.9 1.90 10.3* 1.91 10.3*
N 2,530 2,530 2,530
Adjusted R2 0.434 0.549 0.549
Notes: The total sample consists of faculty members with at least one publication in the top 81 departments worldwide
according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking. In all cases, productivity is measured according to the Q index, and an
individual is Young if Experience≤ 20 and Old if Experience> 20.
∗Significant at the 95% confidence level.
ranking.10 It should be noted that in Section IV.B
we explore the consequences of considering a
partition into five department categories: on one
hand, among the first 25 U.S departments we
10. In particular, the last 27 U.S. departments include
nine institutions that range from positions 32 to 44 in the
Econphd ranking, and 18 departments ranging from positions
51 to 78, while the 29 OSC departments include four depart-
ments in the range 12 to 24, seven departments ranging from
positions 30 to 45, and 18 departments ranging from positions
46 to 81 (Table A in Appendix S1).
distinguish between the top 10 and the next 15
U.S. departments whereas, on the other hand, we
distinguish between the departments in Canada
and the UK and those in the remaining nine OSC.
Together with the brain drain, there is a
second group of scientists who study and/or
work abroad followed by a return to the home
country—a phenomenon known as brain circu-
lation. Such people return home with the human
capital they would not have acquired if it were
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not for the possibility of temporary emigration.11
Therefore, it is convenient to partition individ-
uals working in each of the two geographical
areas in 2007 into three groups: brain drain,
brain circulation—which will be referred to as
movers—and stayers (Table 1A). We begin by
comparing the productivity of foreigners and
stayers in the two geographical areas control-
ling for the type of department in which they
work in 2007 (dummy variables USTop25 and
USLast27). Omitting all control variables, model
2 is the following:
Log Q = α0 + β1USForeigners(2)
+ β2USStayers + β3OSCForeigners
+ δ1USTop25 + δ2USLast27 + ϵ
where the constant includes OSC stayers. To test
for the existence of department effects we specify
the following hypothesis:
Between foreigners or stayers inUSTop25 and
USLast27, H0: δ1 −δ2 = 0;
Between foreigners in USLast27 and OSC,
H0: (δ2 +β1)−β3 = 0;
Between stayers in USLast27 and OSC, H0:
δ2 +β2 = 0.
In turn, the key comparisons between the
productivity of foreigners and stayers requires
testing whether β1 −β2 = 0 in the United States,
and whether β3 = 0 in the OSC.
Together with demographic variables, we
include two dummy variables for the individu-
als in brain circulation (USbc and OSCbc), as
well as a set of dummy variables that capture
the progression of economists through their
undergraduate and graduate education to the
first part of their academic career. Specifically,
these variables capture the university where
individuals obtain their B.A., their Ph.D., or
where they held their first job. The distribution
of the 2,530 economists in the sample according
to these career variables is in Table 2. In each
case, we distinguish between different types of
U.S. universities, universities in the European
Union before the 2004 accession (EU hereafter),
and universities from the Rest of the World
(RW hereafter).
From the descriptive point of view, the follow-
ing four comments are in order. First, brain cir-
culation is a very small contingent in the United
11. For the brain circulation phenomenon, see inter alia
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Grogger and Hanson (2013),
and Kahn and MacGarvie (2016).
States (0.3% of the total), but a larger one in the
OSC (7.1%). Otherwise, there are more stayers
than foreigners in both areas. Second, U.S. gradu-
ate schools are very attractive for this set of highly
productive economists. In particular, approxi-
mately 44% of them earned their Ph.D. at the ten
top U.S. schools. Third, because some individu-
als returned home after earning their Ph.D., those
holding a first job in the United States are almost
12 percentage points lower than those graduating
there. Finally, after a reshuffling at the next stage,
the number of people working in 2007 in the
United States or in the European OSC increases
somewhat, while the number of people working
in the non-European OSC decreases. The end
result is that only 38.7% of the sample is born
in the United States, but 62.0% end up working
there in 2007—a strong funneling effect toward
the United States.
Regression results for model 2 are in the
middle panel of Table 2.12 The following four
points should be noted. First, because all USbc
work in USTop25, the coefficient of the former
cannot be identified. Second, among control vari-
ables all demographic variables are significant.
Experience and cohort effects are very similar
to those analyzed for model 1 (for details, see
Table B.1 in Appendix I in Albarrán, Carrasco,
and Ruiz-Castillo 2016). However, only three
of the other control variables are significant:
individuals having earned a Ph.D. in Harvard
or MIT or the RW, or having had a first job
in any of the ten top U.S. universities have a
significantly greater productivity than the corre-
sponding reference group. The inclusion of the
28 nondemographic dummy variables increases
the adjusted R2 from 0.436 to 0.549. Third,
as expected, the difference δ1 −δ2 = 0.6350
is statistically significant (p= 0.000), indicat-
ing the existence of strong department effects
in the United States. What about department
effects between USLast27 and OSC? We find
that the expressions (δ2 +β1)−β3 = 0.1627 and
δ2 +β2 = 0.0717 are not significantly different
from zero (p values 0.119 and 0.749). This indi-
cates that the productivity of economists in the
last 27 U.S. departments and the 29 OSC depart-
ments is indistinguishable. Given the overlapping
of the department rankings in the two groups
(see note 10), this is not a surprising result.
The existence of department effects in the
United States requires discussing whether higher
12. All regressions in the paper include clustered stan-
dard errors by the university where each individual works in
2007.
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performing universities contribute to the produc-
tivity of individual researchers and/or whether
they simply attract more productive individu-
als. As indicated in the Introduction, our data
do not allow us to address this issue. However,
the results of the literature on the existence of
spillover effects are clearly negative (Azoulay,
Zivin, and Wang 2010; Borjas and Doran 2015;
Dubois, Rochet, and Schlenker 2014; Han Kim,
Morse, and Zingales 2009; Waldinger 2012). In
particular, in their important contribution to the
decline of spillover effects in the top 25 U.S.
university economics and finance departments
over the 1970–2001 period, Han Kim, Morse,
and Zingales (2009) conclude that the loss of
spillover effects among elite universities is due to
advances in communication technology.13 Natu-
rally, the decline of spillover effects is compat-
ible with the permanence of department effects.
As Han Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) indi-
cate, “The difference in average individual pro-
ductivity between the top 25 universities and the
others has increased, not decreased, in the last
three decades. Elite universities seem to attract
and retain the most productive researchers, even
though these universities do not make their fac-
ulty more productive” (p. 355). This is, of course,
what we find in our dataset: highly productive
economists tend to come together in institutions
of high productivity and prestige in a hierarchi-
cally ordered manner. Han Kim, Morse, and Zin-
gales (2009) argue that, on the supply side, top
researchers agglomerate in institutions with pres-
tigious undergraduate programs and in depart-
ments with high past research reputations. Such
agglomeration could be due to the utility and the
prestige of colocation with other creative minds.
This, together with the role of meritocratic cri-
teria and a reasonable degree of ability in hir-
ing and promoting decisions on the demand side
in a highly competitive market, help account for
the existence of a clear hierarchical department
structure, such as the one revealed in the Econ-
phd department ranking and the two types of U.S.
departments distinguished so far.
A final key question for us in model 2 is
the comparison between the productivity of
migrants and stayers. We find that the difference
13. It should be noted that the list of 25 departments
in Han Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) includes our first
15 U.S. departments. Together with the University of British
Columbia, located in Canada, three other of their departments
appear between positions 16 to 20 in our U.S. ranking, while
the remaining six appear in the positions 26, 28, 30, 34, 43,
and 46 of that ranking.
β1 −β2 = 0.2910 (p= 0.117) and the coefficient
β3 (t value= 1.67) are not significantly differ-
ent from zero, indicating that foreigners and
stayers in the two geographical areas appear to
be equally productive. This is exactly what we
obtain when we maintain all control variables
but omit department fixed effects in model 2: the
difference β1 −β2 = 0.2831 (p= 0.120) and the
coefficient β3 (t statistic= 1.68) are not signifi-
cantly different from zero (complete results for
this intermediate specification between model
1 and model 2 are available on request). These
results suggest that department effects and
the migrant/stayer condition are uncorrelated.
However, this is not the end of the story. In the
next step, we explore what happens within each
department category by including interactions
between dummy variables for foreigners and
stayers (Frg and Sty) and the partition of U.S.
departments into the Top25 and the Last27.
Foreigners Versus Stayers: Final Specification.
Omitting control variables, model 3 becomes:
Log Q = α0 + β1 (USTop25 × Frg)(3)
+ β2 (USTop25 × Sty) + β3 (USLast27 × Frg)
+ β4 (USLast27 × Sty) + β5 (OSC × Frg) + ϵ
where the constant includes OSC stayers. It
should be noted that the proportion of migrants
in the three department categories are the follow-
ing: 42.8% in the top U.S. departments, 38.7%
in the bottom U.S. departments, and 38.5% in
the OSC. Regression results for model 3 are in
the right-hand panel in Table 2. Key productivity
comparisons between migrants and stayers in
the three department categories requires testing
whether β1 −β2 = 0, β3 −β4 = 0, and β5 = 0,
respectively. Two-sided test results—presented
in column 1 in Table 3—are as follows. First,
in the last 27 U.S. departments β4 is not sig-
nificantly different from zero, and foreigners
are more productive than stayers. Second, the
situation is the opposite in the top 25 U.S.
departments and the OSC.
As observed in Table 1B, the proportion of
young and older people in the three department
categories is very different for migrants and stay-
ers. Thus, it appears essential to incorporate vin-
tage effects in model 3.14 This is what we do in
what we call the final specification, whose results
for the key variables in the total sample appear
14. We thank a referee for pointing this out.
9
TABLE 3
Two-Sided Tests of Hypothesis Concerning Productivity Comparisons Between Foreigners and
Stayers
Final Specification
Model 3
Total Sample
(1)
Total Sample
(2)
Elite
(3)
Quantile Regr.
95th Percentile (4)
(A) Dept. categories
1. Top 25 U.S. departments No (0.28)
Young No (0.54) No (0.72) No (0.42)
Old Yes (0.09) No (0.26) No (0.46)
2. Last 27 U.S. departments Yes (0.03)
Young Yes (0.04) No (0.91) No (0.40)
Old Yes (0.03) No (0.87) No (0.59)
3. 29 OSC departments No (t statistic)= 1.67)
Young No (0.33) No (0.25) No (0.28)
Old No (t statistic= 1.65) No (t statistic= 1.80) No (t statistic= 0.31)
(B) Department categories
1. Top 10 U.S. departments
Young No (0.56) No (0.97)
Old Yes (0.04) No (0.14)
2. Next 15 U.S. departments
Young No (0.44) No (0.40)
Old No (0.11) No (0.36)
3. Last 27 U.S. departments
Young Yes (0.02) No (0.70)
Old Yes (0.02) No (0.67)
4. Canada+UK departments
Young No (0.14) No (0.83)
Old No (0.91) Yes (0.07)
5. Other OSC departments
Young No (0.74) Yes (0.06)
Old No (t statistic= 0.71) No (t statistic= 0.08)
Notes: The total sample consists of faculty members with at least one publication in the top 81 departments worldwide
according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking, while the elite consists of individuals with above average productivity.
Final specification for the total sample and the elites (Productivity measure=Q index, Young if Exp ≤20, and Old if Exp >20).
Hypothesis testing, results: Yes= foreigners are more productive than stayers; No= foreigners and stayers are equally productive;
p values in brackets.
in Table 4 (for complete results, see Table 4 in
Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo 2016). The
following three points should be noted.
First, among control variables all demo-
graphic variables are significant. However, in
the presence of interactions between the vari-
able Young and foreigners and stayers in all
department categories, we must differentiate
between cohort effects for young foreigners and
young stayers in each case. Experience effects
are of the same order of magnitude as we have
found in previous specifications. As expected,
cohort effects for both foreigners and stayers
are greater in the top 25 U.S. departments than
in the last two bottom department categories.
Moreover, cohort effects are greater for for-
eigners than for stayers in each department
category (for detailed results, see Table B.2 in
Appendix I in Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-
Castillo 2016). However, the only significant
variables among the other control variables are
the same three we have found in previous specifi-
cations. The adjusted R2 in the final specification
is 0.551.
Second, as observed in Table 4, 10 of the 13
variables describing the two cohorts of movers
and stayers in the three department categories are
significant. For our purposes, the following result
should be emphasized: the productivity of both
young and older stayers in the last 27 U.S. depart-
ments is indistinguishable from the productivity
of the reference group, namely OSC older stay-
ers. Instead, the productivity of migrants is hier-
archically ordered in the top 25 U.S. departments,
the last 27 U.S. departments, and the 29 OSC
departments (p values for the productivity com-
parisons between foreigners in the last 27 U.S.
departments and the OSC are equal to 0.123 for
the young and 0.055 for the older individuals).
Consequently, the standing of the bottom U.S.
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TABLE 4
Final Specification for the Total Sample and the Elite
Dependent Variable: log Q
Final Specification
Total Sample Elite
Coeff. t Statistic Coeff. t Statistic
1. U.S. brain circulation 1.15 2.6* 0.77 2.6*
2. U.S. top 25, foreigners, young 1.43 5.1* 0.40 3.4*
3. U.S. top 25, foreigners, old 1.11 5.6* 0.44 5.1*
4. U.S. top 25, stayers, young 1.32 4.2* 0.35 2.0*
5. U.S. top 25, stayers, old 0.77 3.0* 0.29 2.0*
6. U.S. last 27, foreigners, young 0.91 3.3* 0.25 2.1*
7. U.S. last 27, foreigners, old 0.65 3.1* 0.15 2.0*
8. U.S. last 27, stayers, young 0.52 1.7 0.23 1.4
9. U.S. last 27, stayers, old 0.10 0.4 0.12 0.8
10. OSC brain circ. 0.59 2.7* 0.24 2.7*
11. OSC foreigners, young 0.73 3.0* 0.23 2.0*
12. OSC foreigners, old 0.27 1.6 0.12 1.8
13. OSC stayers, young 0.57 2.4* 0.12 1.1
14. OSC stayers, old, reference group — — — —
Constant 1.18 8.6* 5.46 22.7*
N 2,530 833
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.317
Notes: The total sample consists of faculty members with at least one publication in the top 81 departments worldwide
according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking, while the elite consists of individuals with above average productivity.
In all cases, productivity is measured according to the Q index, and an individual is Young if Experience≤ 20, and Old if
Experience> 20.
∗Significant at the 95% confidence level.
departments is maintained thanks to the produc-
tivity of its foreign faculty.15
Third, test results concerning the six produc-
tivity comparisons between foreigners and stay-
ers are as follows (column 2 in Table 3): (1) in the
top U.S. category, only older migrants are more
productive than stayers; (2) in the bottom U.S.
category, both young and older migrants are more
productive than stayers, and (3) in the OSC, the
productivity of both cohorts of migrants is indis-
tinguishable from the productivity of stayers.
B. Results for the Elite
As indicated in the Introduction, the mixed
evidence found in the literature concerning
productivity comparisons between migrants and
stayers in the United States for samples of differ-
ent nature and different size suggests analyzing
the question using different quality thresholds in
our case. Consequently, we study whether the
15. It would be interesting to know whether the large
share of economists who are migrants in the last 27 U.S. Eco-
nomics departments, as well as their productivity differential
relative to stayers, are maintained in the next layer of less pro-
ductive U.S. institutions.
results in the total sample are maintained in the
elite consisting of 833 economists with above
average productivity.
Descriptive statistics are in the right-hand side
of Table 1A. Four points should be noted. First,
the proportion of young people for all cohort defi-
nitions decreases: relative to the total sample, old
people are overrepresented in the elite. Second,
relative to the total sample the proportion of U.S.
stayers (mostly in the top 25 U.S. departments)
increases, whereas the proportion of migrants
in the United States remains constant. Third,
the proportion of people of all sorts working
in 2007 the OSC—brain circulation, migrants
and stayers—decreases. Finally, the proportions
of migrants in the three department categories
are the following: 35.0% in the top U.S. depart-
ments, 40.6% in the bottom U.S. departments,
and 29.4% in the OSC.
Regression results for the key variables in the
elite appear in the last two columns in Table 4
(for complete results, see Table 3 in Albar-
rán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo 2016). Among
demographic variables, the following two points
should be noted. First, among experience and
cohort variables only Exp is significant. In any
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case, the size of experience effects in the elite is
much smaller than in the total sample. Two fac-
tors might help explain this pattern: (1) a stronger
taste for “puzzle solving,” peer recognition, and
monetary rewards for top researchers produces a
flattening of the productivity profile (Levin and
Stephan 1991), and (2) institutional explanatory
variables—such as research funding and promo-
tion policies—may operate differentially across
the distribution of scientific performance favor-
ing those on the top (Kelchtermans and Veugel-
ers 2011). Second, the productivity of females
—representing 5.4% of the elite—is still smaller
than the productivity of males, but the gender
effect is considerably smaller than in the total
sample: 15.4% rather than 57.9%. This is in line
with the results of Kelchtermans and Veugelers
(2012): although females are significantly less
likely to reach top performance first, once they
manage to do that the gender bias is considerably
reduced. On the other hand, among the other con-
trol variables, only earning a Ph.D. in any of the
50 schools different from Harvard and MIT has a
negative significant effect relative to earning it in
the EU. The adjusted R2 is 0.317, versus 0.551 in
the total sample.
Intuitively, increasing the quality threshold
and reducing the sample size, would tend to make
elite members more homogeneous among each
other in each of the three department categories
we have been studying. As a matter of fact, our
extension of Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton’s
(2009) model in Appendix S1 establishes that
the higher the quality threshold considered, the
closer the average productivity of foreigners and
stayers is expected to be. As can be observed
in column 3 in Table 3, this is exactly what
happens for all comparisons where foreign-
ers were more productive than stayers in the
total sample.
IV. ROBUSTNESS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
RESULTS
A. The Treatment of the Elite
We begin by exploring the elite’s role using
quantile regressions.16 Our results indicate that
the disappearance of the productivity differences
betweenmigrants and stayers in the United States
is reached at the 95th percentile (Table C in
Appendix I in Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-
Castillo 2016), whereas p values for productiv-
ity comparisons are in column 4 in Table 3.
16. We thank a referee for suggesting this possibility.
Of course, quantile regressions use all data in
the total sample but apply different weights at
observations below and above a given percentile,
whereas results for the elite are obtained using
exclusively its 833 observations. Recall that the
elite includes individuals with above average
productivity beyond the 67th percentile of the
Q distribution. Taking into account that the elite
productivity distribution is as highly skewed as
the total sample distribution, and the mean is
located at the 65th percentile, ordinary least
squares (OLS) results for the elite are at, approx-
imately, the 88.5th percentile of the original dis-
tribution. Thus, using quantile regressions for the
total sample or OLS for the elite leads to the
same conclusions.
B. The Partition of Departments
So far, we have distinguished between two
department categories in the United States: the
top 25 and the last 27 departments. However,
in view of the possible existence of department
effects within the first category, it appears inter-
esting to explore a partition including the top
ten and the next 15 U.S. departments. However,
Canada and the UK are English-speaking coun-
tries whose higher education systems are closer in
governance to the U.S. system than to the systems
in the other countries with at least one department
in the sample (the Netherlands, Spain, Israel,
Sweden, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark,
and China). Therefore, it appears interesting to
explore a partition including the eight UK depart-
ments and the four Canadian departments in one
category, and the remaining 17 departments in
the OSC in another. Surprisingly enough, in the
total sample the proportion of young and older
foreigners in Canada and the UK is consider-
ably greater than in the other four department
categories (Table D in Appendix I in Albarrán,
Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo 2016).
Regression results for the key variables for
the total sample and the elite are in Table B in
Appendix S1 (complete results are available upon
request). We observe that, as expected, there are
strong department effects: for migrants and stay-
ers in both cohorts the top 10, the next 15, the
last 27 U.S. departments, and the other OSC are
hierarchically ordered. Moreover, the productiv-
ity of economists in Canada and the UK is indis-
tinguishable from the productivity of those in the
last 27 U.S. departments.
Results and p values concerning productivity
comparisons between migrants and stayers are in
Panel B in Table 3. Three points should be noted.
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First, the main novelty is that the productivity dif-
ference between older migrants and older stayers
in the top 25 U.S. departments in the previous
partition is seen to be essentially due to the sit-
uation in the top 10 U.S. departments. Second,
it is important to emphasize that, as before, all
significant productivity differences in the United
States in the total sample vanish when we move
to the elite. This is in spite of the fact that the pro-
portion of young and older foreigners in the bot-
tom U.S. departments in the elite is considerably
above average. Third, there are two exceptions to
the similarity between foreigners and stayers in
the elite. The first one is among the old in Canada
and the UK, where there is an above average pro-
portion of foreigners (Table D in Appendix I in
Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo 2016). The
second exception is among the small group of 27
young economists in other OSC.
Given these results, for the sake of simplicity
we continue the analysis restricting the attention
to the partition of the 81 departments into only
three categories.
C. The Definition of the Two Cohorts
Based on the analysis in Section III.A, so
far we have considered young individuals with
Exp≤ 20. Next, we must study the robustness
of our results to alternative definitions, namely,
when Exp≤ 15 and Exp≤ 24. Demographic
effects, the significance of other control variables
and the adjusted R2 in the total sample and
the elite is of the same order of magnitude for
the three cohort definitions. Moreover, since
differences in the key productivity comparisons
are minor, there are no reasons to depart from
our preferred specification where Young= 1 if
Exp≤ 20 (for a detailed analysis, see Section
IV.3 in Albarrán, Carrasco, and Ruiz-Castillo
2016).
D. The Measurement of Individual Productivity
So far, we have used index Q as our produc-
tivity measure. In this subsection, we explore
the robustness of our results when we use index
Q′, characterized by smaller weights for top
journals, and index P, namely, the unweighted
number of publications of all sorts. The p values
for productivity comparisons are in Table 5
(regression results for the key variables for the
total sample and the elite are available in Table
G in Appendix I in Albarrán, Carrasco, and
Ruiz-Castillo 2016).
Results concerning productivity comparisons
between foreigners and stayers under index
Q′ coincide with those obtained under index
Q. However, using the unweighted number of
publications breaks up the unanimous agreement
concerning the superiority of foreigners over
stayers in the last 27 U.S. departments in the
total sample: young foreigners and stayers are
now indistinguishable. Moreover, contrary also
to all previous results, young migrants are more
productive than young stayers in the OSC in the
elite. We conclude that, as long as we recog-
nize the merit of publishing in more prestigious
TABLE 5
Two-Sided Tests of Hypothesis Concerning Productivity Comparisons Between Foreigners and
Stayers for Different Productivity Measures
Productivity Measures
Q′ Index P Index
Total Sample Elite I Total Sample Elite I
1. Top 25 U.S. departments
Young No (0.59) No (0.51) No (0.81) No (0.96)
Old No (0.10) No (0.12) No (0.24) No (0.40)
2. Last 27 U.S. departments
Young Yes (0.06) No (0.68) No (0.51) No (0.32)
Old Yes (0.03) No (0.68) Yes (0.07) No (0.96)
3. 29 OSC departments
Young No (0.34) No (0.15) No (0.82) Yes (0.08)
Old No (t statistic= 1.63) No (t statistic= 1.51) No (t statistic= 0.37) No (t statistic=−0.78)
Notes: The total sample consists of faculty members with at least one publication in the top 81 departments worldwide
according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking. Total sample (an individual is Young if Experience ≤20, and Old if
Experience> 20). Hypothesis testing, results: Yes= foreigners are more productive than stayers; No= foreigners and stayers
are equally productive; p values in brackets.
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journal classes, our results are robust to different
weighting schemes.
E. A Plausible Interpretation
In a world of decreasing transportation, com-
munication, and migration costs of all sorts
we should expect the convergence between the
average productivity of foreigners and stayers
(Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton 2009). This is
what we find in the total sample for the young
people in the top 25 U.S departments (repre-
senting 18.8% of the population), older people
in the intermediate 15 U.S. departments (repre-
senting 8.6%), and in both cohorts in the OSC
(representing 26.4% of the total).
However, this is not the case for some groups
(i.e., older people in the top ten U.S. departments,
and both cohorts in the bottom U.S. departments)
in the total sample. How should we interpret these
findings? One possibility is that migration per se
is a cause of superior performance, in which case
there are positive externalities to be gained by
promoting mobile scientists to work with domes-
tic scientists. As pointed out by Franzoni, Scel-
lato, and Stephan (2014), in this case migration is
not a zero-sum game in the sense that the benefits
that accrue to the destination country do not nec-
essarily come at the expense of the sending coun-
try. An alternative interpretation is that the talent
distributions under comparison are not the same.
Based in the following two considerations, this
is the type of explanation we provisionally favor.
Consider first older migrants in our dataset
having obtained their Ph.D. in the 1975–1987
period, and having between 50 and 62 years of
age in 2007. This subset approximately coin-
cides with the cohorts of foreigners entering the
United States between 1975 and 1985 inMcDow-
ell and Singell (2000), whose productivity is also
greater than the productivity of the corresponding
native-born economists. These authors attribute
this productivity differential during the period
1975–1989 to the fact that stricter visa require-
ments for foreigners imposed in 1972—that is,
an increase in mobility costs in Hunter, Oswald,
and Charlton’s (2009)model—and a poormarket
for academics beginning in the 1970s may have
made Economics departments in that period rel-
atively more selective in their hiring of foreign-
born economists.
Next, consider U.S. stayers in the bottom U.S.
departments, whose productivity is indistinguish-
able from the productivity of stayers in the OSC.
U.S. nationals have to balance the attraction and
costs of an academic career with the opportuni-
ties that the U.S. economy offers to highly skilled
economists outside academia. Judging from their
relatively weak performance, those who choose
an academic life at the bottom of the scale are
considerably less productive and/or less moti-
vated than those who are able to work at the top
25 departments. Instead, foreigners in the top and
bottom U.S. departments appear to be equally
motivated to pursue an academic career in the
United States. The latter maintain a good per-
formance, just below the former, and essentially
above what foreigners exhibit in the OSC.
Joining these two sets of ideas helps in
explaining why migrants are more productive
than stayers among people older than 50 in the
top ten U.S. departments (representing 7.7% of
the total), and among both cohorts in the last
27 U.S. departments (representing 26.5% of
the total).
However, it should be emphasized that,
in agreement with our extension of Hunter,
Oswald, and Charlton’s (2009) model, as soon
as we restrict attention to an elite consisting
of economists with above average productivity,
all productivity differences between migrants
and stayers in the United States vanish. This
distinction helps to make compatible apparently
divergent results in the literature for datasets
of scientists of very different size and com-
position (Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton 2009,
vs. McDowell and Singell 2000, and Franzoni,
Scellato, and Stephan 2014).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have measured the individ-
ual productivity of a set of 2,530 highly pro-
ductive economists in terms of a quality index
that weights the number of publications from
the beginning of everyone’s academic career
up to 2007 in four journal classes. Individual
productivity distributions in all scientific fields
are highly skewed regardless of the productivity
measure and the size of the population studied.
Accounting for such large differences for highly
productive economists is the thread that runs
throughout the paper. However, we have focused
on productivity comparisons between migrants
and stayers in 52 U.S. departments and 29 depart-
ments in the 11 countries with at least one depart-
ment in the sample.
Our contributions can be summarized in the
following two points. First, controlling for fixed
department effects is not enough: productivity
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comparisons between foreigners and stayersmust
be done within each subgroup of a relevant par-
tition of U.S. departments. Second, confronting
foreigners and stayers in a relatively large sam-
ple of highly productive scientists or in a small
sample of elite scientists in the upper tail of
the productivity distribution are different matters.
Whether the situation is different in top and bot-
tom institutions, and whether the differences—if
any—in larger samples disappear in elite subsets
are interesting topics for further research in other
scientific disciplines.
At any rate, the superior ex post migrants’
performance in some groups and the indistin-
guishable performance between foreigners and
stayers in the remaining groups would tend to
confirm the validity of policies aimed at facili-
tating increased brain exchange across countries
(Franzoni, Scellato, and Stephan 2014). We may
add that, as long as the concentration of talent
in the United States results from the working
of a highly competitive market worldwide, effi-
ciency is well served from a global point of view.
Furthermore, we should take into account that
migrants decide where to live in a voluntary way.
However, there are two objections to this view.
First, a number of contributions—written
from a European perspective—explain this
situation in terms of differences in resources
and university governance on both sides of the
Atlantic (Ali et al. 2007; Bauwens, Mion, and
Thisse 2008; Aghion et al. 2008; Veugelers and
Van der Ploeg 2008; Drèze and Estevan 2007; and
Section 5.2.1 in Doquier and Rapoport 2012).
From this perspective, it might be argued that
the degree of concentration of the best talent in
the United States constitutes only a second best.
Better governance and some additional resources
for research institutions in the EU and the RW
may give rise to an improved global situation
with the highly productive less concentrated in
the United States.
Second, other qualified economists question
whether the concentration of the best talent
working and/or studying in a few U.S. universi-
ties has gone too far. On the one hand, Jacques
Drèze states: “It is thought provoking that world-
wide economic research is being pursued under
the leadership of a couple hundred university
professors trained and employed by a handful
of U.S. departments” (Drèze and Estevan 2007,
p. 286). On the other hand, Oswald (2007, p. 2)
has pointed out that great discoveries often come
from unconventional ways of thinking. “This
makes me believe that dropping so many of
Planet Earth’s scientists into the same American
part of the globe may make them worryingly
homogeneous. Such intellectual homogeneity
could, in the long run, be bad for scientific knowl-
edge and thus for human welfare on our planet.”
We should close this discussion indicating
that, needless to say, immigration/emigration and
other policy recommendations requires studying
the results from more representative samples,
including the high skilled working outside the
academic sector, as well as the low-skilled
migrants. This should incorporate the recent
literature on immigration emphasizing different
channels through which sending countries may
benefit from international mobility in a context
of increasing globalization. However, progress-
ing in these directions is beyond the scope of
this study.
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